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Severed Mineral Interests of Unknown
or Missing Owners in Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Kentucky General Assembly passed legislation
designed to facilitate development of severed mineral interests
with missing or unknown owners.' This legislation provides a
judicial procedure whereby title to a severed estate might pass
to the surface owner when the estate could not be developed
because the owner was missing or unknown. 2 Six months before
Kentucky's statute became effective, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a similar Indiana statute in Texaco, Inc. v. Short.3
Although Short provided much needed validity to this type of
legislation, 4 its application to the Kentucky statute is somewhat
I KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 353.460-.476 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983) [hereinafter
KRS with all cites being to Michie/Bobbs-Merrill]. For a discussion of statutes already
enacted in other states see Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25
Rocky MTN. Mn . L. INST. § 20-1, §§ 20-27 to 45 (1979) (listing and discussing "dormant
mineral statutes" which provide for the extinction of severed mineral interests unless
preserved through use or other action); id. at §§ 20-46 to 56 (listing and discussing those
statutes providing for court appointment of trustees empowered to lease the interest for
the benefit of the missing or unknown mineral owner). For further distinction between
"dormant mineral statutes" and trustee type statutes, compare the statutory scheme
detailed infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text with infra notes 23-27 and accompa-
nying text.
2 See infra note 23.
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
4 By the time Short was decided, these relatively new statutes had been the subject
of so many successful constitutional attacks that their validity was seriously in question.
See Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978) (finding the statute
invalid insofar as it applied retroactively); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn.
1979) (holding that the statute was partially unconstitutional due to inadequate notice
provisions failing to provide an opportunity for a pre-forfeiture hearing); Wilson v.
Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980) (similarly denying validity due to lack of
notice and opportunity to be heard); Chicago and Northwestern Transp. Co. v. Pederson,
40 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977) (finding an unreasonable exercise of police
power in giving the forfeited rights to the surface owner in addition to falling for lack
of notice and opportunity to be heard). But see Van Slotten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21,
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limited due to differences between the Kentucky and Indiana
statutes.5
The most important implication of Short with respect to the
Kentucky statute is that the notice provisions of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 6 apply to the statute's op-
eration.7 Therefore, the validity of proceedings under the Ken-
tucky statute extends only as far as the validity of the notice
system it employs.8
This Comment addresses the implications of the Short deci-
sion for Kentucky's statute, analyzes the statute's notice provi-
sions, and provides suggestions for improving the statute against
potential constitutional challenges.
I. TnE INDIANA STATUTE AND Texaco, Inc. v. Short
In 1971 Indiana passed a statute providing that severed min-
eral interests which had been unused for 20 years would auto-
matically lapse and revert to the current surface owner unless
the mineral owner preserved the interest by filing a statement of
claim in the local county recorder's office. 9 The statute also
299 N.W.2d 704 (1980) (analogizing the statute to recording statutes and marketable
title acts and holding the statute constitutional against challenges that the statute: 1) was
an unconstitutional impairment of contract; 2) was violative of the prohibition against
property deprivation without due process of law; 3) created an arbitrary and unreason-
ably conclusive presumption of abandonment; 4) provided no opportunity for notice or
hearing prior to vesting title in the surface owner; and 5) was a violation of the equal
protection clause because it treated oil and gas interests differently than hard minerals).
I The version approved in Short was the "dormant mineral statute", detailed
infra notes 9-11, whereas Kentucky's statute was the "trustee" version detailed infra
notes 23-27.
6 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Short, 454 U.S. at 535, 535 n.28.
I See Davis v. Schimmel, 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972). In Davis, the
court stated:
Due process requires, at a minimum, that one be given a meaningful
opportunity for a hearing, appropriate to the nature of the case and
preceded by notice, before he is deprived of any significant property
interest, except where some valid overriding state interest justifies postpon-
ing the hearing until after the event.
Id. at 789. See also Board of Levee Comm'rs v. Johnson, 178 Ky. 287, 199 S.W. 8
(1917).
9 InD. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 to 8 (Burns 1980) provides:
32-5-11-1 [46-1808). Lapse of mineral interest-Prevention.-Any interest
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provided that an owner of ten or more mineral interests in the
in coal, oil and gas, and other minerals, shall, if unused for a period of
20 years, be extinguished, unless a statement of claim is filed in accordance
with section five [32-5-11] hereof, and the ownership shall revert to the
then owner of the interest out of which it was carved. 32-5-11-2 [46-1809].
Mineral Interest-Definition.-A mineral interest shall be taken to mean
the interest which is created by an instrument transferring, either by grant,
assignment, or reservation, or otherwise an interest, of any kind, in coal,
oil and gas, and other minerals. 32-5-11-3 [46-1810]. Use of mineral inter-
ests-Definition.-A mineral interest shall be deemed to be used where
there are any minerals produced thereunder or when operations are being
conducted thereon for injection, withdrawal, storage or disposal of water,
gas or other fluid substances, or when rentals or royalties are being paid
by the owner thereof for the purpose of delaying or enjoying the use or
exercise of such rights or when any such use is being carried out on any
tract with which such mineral interest may be unitized or pooled for
production purposes, or when in the case of coal or other solid minerals,
there is production from a common vein or seam by the owners of such
mineral interests, or when taxes are paid on such mineral interest by the
owner thereof. Any use pursuant to or authorized by the instrument
creating such mineral interest shall be effective to continue in force all
rights granted by such instrument. 32-5-11-4 [46-1811]. Statement of claim-
Filing-Requirements.-The statement of claim provided in section one
[32-5-11-1] above shall be filed by the owner of the mineral interest prior
to the end of the twenty-year period set forth in section two [one] [32-5-
11-1] or within two [2] years after the effective date [September 2, 1971]
of this act, whichever is later, and shall contain the name and address of
the owner of such interest, and description of the land, on or under which
such mineral interest is located. Such statement of claim shall be filed in
the office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which such land is
located. Upon the filing of the statement of claim within the time provided,
it shall be deemed that such mineral interest was being used on the date
the statement of claim was filed. 32-5-11-5 [46-1812]. Extinguishment of
mineral interest-Exceptions.-Failure to file a statement of claim within
the time provided in section 4 [32-5-11-4] shall not cause a mineral interest
to be extinguished if the owner of such mineral interest:
(1) Was at the time of the expiration of the period provided in section
four [32-5-11-4], the owner of ten [10] or more mineral interests, as above
defined, in the county in which such mineral interest is located, and;
(2) Made diligent effort to preserve all of such interests as were not being
used, and did within a period of ten [10] years prior to the expiration of
the period provided in section four [32-5-11-4] preserve other mineral
interests, in said county, but the filing of statements of claim as herein
required, and;
(3) Failed to preserve such interest through inadvertence, and;
(4) Filed the statement of claim herein required, within sixty [60] days after
publication of notice as provided in section seven [32-5-11-7] herein, if
such notice is published, within sixty [60] days after receiving actual knowl-
edge that such mineral interest had lapsed.
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same county as the threatened interest would not forfeit the
interest if he had made diligent efforts to preserve all such
interests but had inadvertently failed to preserve the interest in
question. 0 The Indiana system did not employ a judicial pro-
ceeding but merely provided for automatic termination of the
interest upon failure to comply with the terms of the statute."
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short,12 the United States Supreme Court
considered two cases resulting from the operation of the Indiana
statute. 13 In both cases the owners of the forfeited mineral
32-5-11-6 [46-1813]. Successor in interest-Notice Requirements-Prima
facie evidence.-Any person who will succeed to the ownership of any
mineral interest, upon the lapse thereof, may give notice of the lapse of
such mineral interest by publishing the same in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county in which such mineral interest is located, and, if
the address of such mineral interest owner is shown of record or can be
determined upon reasonable inquiry, by mailing within ten [101 days after
such publication a copy of such notice to the owner of such mineral
interest. The notice shall state the name of the owner of such mineral
interest, as shown of record, a description of the land, and the name of
the person giving such notice. If a copy of such notice, together with an
affidavit of service thereof, shall be promptly filed in the office of the
recorder of deeds in the county wherein such land is located, the record
thereof shall be prima facie evidence, in any legal proceedings, that such
notice was given. 32-5-11-7 [46-1814]. Statement of claim-Filing-Record-
er's duty.-Upon the filing of the statement of claim, provided for in
section 4 [32-5-11-4] of this chapter or the proof of service of notice as
provided in section seven [six] [32-5-11-6] of this chapter in the recorder's
office for the county where such interest is located, the recorder shall
record the same in a book to be kept for that purpose, which shall be
known as the "Dormant Mineral Interest Record" and shall indicate by
marginal notation on the instrument creating the original mineral interest
the filing of the statement of claim or affidavit of publication and service
of notice. 32-5-11-8 [46-18151. Waiver of chapter's provisions-Time limit.-
The provisions of this chapter may not be waived at any time prior to the
expiration of the twenty [20] year period provided in section 1 [32-5-11-1].
Id.
lo See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-5, supra note 9.
See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1, supra note 9.
1 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
' Id. at 521. The Supreme Court of Indiana had previously consolidated the two
cases on appeal. In Comment, Retroactive Land Statutes - Indiana's Dormant Mineral
Act Declared Constitutional, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 783 (1982-83) (authored by Deborah
McHenry Woodguin), a brief explanation of the facts of these cases was provided:
In the first case, the appellants included parties who claimed ownership of
fractional mineral interests that had been severed in 1942 and 1944 and
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interests argued that the lack of notice prior to the lapse of their
mineral rights effected a taking of private property without just
compensation, thereby depriving them of property without due
process of law. 14 The Court stated that the due process claim in
reality constituted two arguments: (1) that the State of Indiana
did not adequately notify the mineral owner of the requirements
of the new statute, and (2) that a mineral interest may not be
extinguished unless the surface owner gives the mineral owner
advance notice that such interest is about to expire. 5 Addressing
the first argument, the Court held that a legislature need do no
more than enact and publish the law and afford the citizenry a
reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with the terms of the
new law. 16 The Court noted that "[ilt is well established that
persons owning property within a State are charged with knowl-
their oil and gas lessees whose leases were entered into in 1976 and 1977.
Under the terms of the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act, the appellants' mineral
interests had statutorily lapsed in 1973 when the two year grace period
expired since the mineral interest had not been used as defined by the Act.
In April 1977 the surface owner published a notice of lapse of mineral
interest in an Indiana newspaper circulated in the county where the disputed
mineral interest was located. Additionally, the surface owner mailed notices
to all the appellants except the oil and gas lessees. The surface owner also
filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the rights of the mineral
owners had lapsed.
In the second action the mineral estate had been created in 1954. The
mineral estate owners did not "use" the property until 1976 when a coal
lease was executed with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. Because the
mineral estate owners had not filed a statement of claim in the office of
the county recorder, a statutory lapse occurred in March 1974. In 1977 the
appellees gave notice of the lapse by newspaper publication and letter. The
resulting lawsuit was brought by all parties in order to resolve the conflict-
ing claims to the mineral interests.
Id. at 785-86.
14 Short, 454 U.S. at 522. These arguments were based on the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Id. The owners also contended that the Indiana
statute constituted an impairment of contracts in violation of article I, section 10 of the
United States Constitution. The owners further claimed that the exception granted to
owners of multiple interests denied them equal protection of the law. Id. After holding
the Indiana statute valid in all other respects, the United States Supreme Court turned
to the argument that the statute extinguished the appellants' property rights without
adequate notice. Id. at 530-531.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
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edge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or
disposition of such property."
1 7
The Court then turned to the argument that the notice pro-
visions of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'
8
applied to the lapse situation covered by the statute; i.e., that
the mineral owners were entitled to reasonable notice from the
surface owners that the twenty-year period of non-use was about
to expire.' 9 The Court's resolution turned on the distinction
"between the self-executing feature of the statute and a subse-
quent judicial determination that a particular lapse did in fact
occur." ' 20 Although the Court held that Mullane did not apply
to the self-executing feature of the Indiana statute, 2' it stated
that Mullane would apply to a judicial proceeding. 22 That state-
ment strongly suggests that the notice provisions of Mullane
would apply to the operation of Kentucky's statute.
II. THE KENTUCKY STATUTE
The Kentucky statute provides that "the circuit court ...
shall have the power to declare a trust [in the severed mineral
interest], appoint a trustee for the unknown or missing owners
and authorize the trustee to sell, execute and deliver a valid lease
" Id. The Court also referenced a quote from North Laramie Land Co. v.
Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925):
All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and
must take note of the procedure adopted by them; and when that procedure
is not unreasonable or arbitrary there are not constitutional limitations
relieving them from conforming to it. This is especially the case with
respect to those statutes relating to the taxation or condemnation of land.
Such statutes are universally in force and are general in their application,
facts of which the land owner must take account in providing for the
management of his property and safeguarding his interest in it.
Id. at 283 n.2.
Is 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). ("[Ain elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
11 Short, 454 U.S. at 534-35.
0 Id. at 533.
2 Id. at 535.
22Id.
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thereon . .. " If the severed mineral interests are produced
3 KRS § 353.464 (1983). Section 353.464 provides:
When court may declare trust and appoint trustee; persons authorized to
institute proceedings.
(1) If the title to any severed mineral interest is vested in an unknown or
missing owner and it appears that the development of the minerals will be
advantageous to the owner, the circuit court of the county in which the
minerals or the major portion thereof lies shall have the power to declare
a trust therein, appoint a trustee for the unknown or missing owners and
authorize the trustee to sell, execute and deliver a valid lease thereon on
terms and conditions customary in the area for the minerals covered thereby
and similarly situated. The lease shall continue in full force and effect after
the termination of the trust unless the lease has previously expired by its
own terms.
(2) Proceedings for the appointment of a trustee may be instituted by any
person:
(a) Vested in fee simple with the surface estate overlying the partic-
ular minerals sought to be developed;
(b) Vested in fee simple with an undivided interest in the particular
mineral sought to be developed;
(c) Vested in fee simple with the entire interest in the particular
minerals sought to be developed under lands immediately adjacent
and contiguous to those lands under which the same minerals are
vested in unknown or missing owners; (d) Vested with a valid and
subsisting mineral lease, the lessor of which is a person defined
under either paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection.
Id. See also KRS § 353.460 (1983), which defines an "unknown or missing owner" as:
any person vested with a severed mineral interest and whose present identity
or location cannot be determined from the records of the county in which
the land is located or by diligent inquiry in the vicinity of the owner's last
known place of residence, and shall include his unknown heirs, successors
and assigns.
Id. See also KRS § 353.466 (1983), which provides:
Persons to be joined as defendents; verified petition showing effort to
locate owners; advertisement and lis pendens notice, contents; trustee ad
litem.
(1) The person seeking to impress a trust upon a severed mineral interest
for the purpose of leasing and developing same shall join as defendants to
the action all those persons having record title thereto who are unknown
or missing and the unknown heirs, successors and assigns all of such
persons. The persons named as defendants and who are the unknown or
missing owners as defined herein, shall stand for and represent full title
and the whole interest of the unknown or missing owners in the severed
mineral interest or estate interest therein. All parties not in being who
might have some contingent or future interest therein, and all persons
whether in being or not in being, having any interest, present, future or
contingent, in the severed mineral interests sought to be leased, shall be
fully bound by the proceedings hereunder.
(2) There shall be filed a verified petition specifically setting forth the
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commercially, and the owners remain missing or unknown for
seven years from the date of first production, the trustee is to
"file a motion with the court naming the then present surface
owners as additional parties and requiring the surface owners to
appear and present proof . . that they are vested with fee
simple title to the surface estate." ' 24 If the court finds that the
owners have fee simple title to the surface, it shall order "the
trustee to convey to the surface owners by recordable instrument
the unknown or missing owners' interest in the severed mineral
efforts to locate and identify the unknown or missing owners of the
interests to be leased and such other information known to the petitioner
which might be helpful in identifying or locating the present owner thereof.
There shall be attached to the petition as an exhibit thereto a certified
copy of the instrument creating the original severance and such additional
instruments as are necessary to show the vesting of title to the minerals in
the last record owner thereof. The petitioner shall establish to the satisfac-
tion of the court that a diligent effort has been made to identify and locate
the present owners of said interests.
(3) Service of process shall be as provided by the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure and there shall be filed a lis pendens notice in the county clerk's
office of the county wherein the mineral estate or the larger portion thereof
lies. Immediately upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall ad-
vertise as provided in KRS Chapter 424. Both the advertisement and the
lis pendens notice shall contain the names of all of the parties and their
last known addresses, the date and recording data of the original deed or
other conveyance which created the mineral severance, an adequate descrip-
tion of the land as contained therein, the source of title of the last known
owners of the severed mineral interests and a statement that the action is
brought for the purpose of impressing a trust authorizing the execution
and delivery of a valid and present mineral lease for development of the
particular minerals described in the petition. The court, in its discretion,
may order advertisement elsewhere or by additional means if there is reason
to believe that additional advertisement might result in identifying and
locating the unknown or missing owners.
(4) The court shall appoint a trustee ad litem, who shall be a licensed,
practicing attorney, to represent the unknown or missing owners and their
unknown heirs, successors and assigns. The trustee ad litem shall review
the petition and file an answer and such other pleadings as are necessary
and proper to represent fairly the interest of the unknown or missing
owners. It shall be the duty of the trustee ad litem to make an independent
inquiry and search for the purpose of identifying and locating the unknown
or missing owners and he shall report to the court the results of the
investigation. The court shall allow the trustee ad litem a reasonable fee
for his services to be taxed as costs.
Id.
, KRS § 353.470(1) (1983).
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interests, which conveyance shall be approved by endorsement
by the court on the face thereof."25 The trustee is also directed
to pay the surface owner any funds "which have accrued to the
credit of the severed mineral interests .... ",26
Under the statute, an action may be commenced by any
person by filing a petition if the person is:
(a) Vested in fee simple with the surface estate overlying the
particular minerals sought to be developed; (b) Vested in fee
simple with an undivided interest in the particular mineral
sought to be developed; (c) Vested in fee simple with the entire
interest in the particular minerals sought to be developed under
lands immediately adjacent and contiguous to those lands un-
der which the same minerals are vested in unknown or missing
owners; [or] (d) Vested with a valid and subsisting mineral
lease, the lessor of which is a person defined under either
paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection.
27
Because the Kentucky statute employs a judicial action com-
menced by the filing of a petition,28 the notice provisions of
Mullane clearly apply to the statute's operation. In Short the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[tihe due process
standards of Mullane apply to an 'adjudication' that is 'to be
accorded finality.' "29 This means that an action will not be
binding under the Kentucky statute unless the person against
whom the outcome is asserted has had notice of the proceedings
and an opportunity to be heard.30 Notice is not required under
the Indiana statute since it provides for automatic termination
of the interest without an adjudication upon failure to comply
with the statute's provisions.3'
25 Id.
KRS § 353.470(2) (1983).
KRS § 353.464(2) (1983).
Compare the Kentucky scheme outlined at supra notes 27-31 and accompanying
text with the Indiana statute set out at supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
Short, 454 U.S. at 534.
-1 See generally, e.g., Pielemier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of
Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383, 395-
415 (1983) (discussing general principles, protected interests, and the ability to assert due
process protection).
11 See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
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III. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS AND THE KENTUCKY STATUTE
Having resolved that the notice requirements of Mullane
apply to the operation of the Kentucky statute,32 a proper ap-
proach for analyzing the statute in light of those requirements
is needed. Such an analysis involves delineating the requirements
of constitutionally adequate notice, and examining the Kentucky
statute and its notice scheme for characteristics relevant to de-
termining the statute's validity. Finally, the constitutional guide-
lines should be applied to those characteristics particular to the
statute and its notice scheme.
The first requirement of constitutionally adequate notice is
that the notice scheme be adequate as required by law, and not
simply provided by procedures developed on a case-by-case ba-
sis.3 That is, constitutionally valid notice must be mandated-
not merely made possible-by the Kentucky statute and the
procedural rules it employs.3 4 Secondly, since the decision in
Shaffer v. Heitner,35 all assertions of jurisdiction must be judged
by the due process standards previously applicable to cases in-
volving in personam jurisdiction.3 6 Third, procedural mecha-
nisms which suffice for parties not reasonably ascertainable are
completely inadequate as to known parties with known places
of residence.37 Where the identity and whereabouts of a person
holding a claim is known, nothing short of mailed notice will
suffice as to that person.3" The final important proposition in a
notice system analysis is that owners and mortgagees identified
in publicly recorded mortgages are entitled to notice of proceed-
ings affecting their real estate interests .
39
32 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
11 Wuchter v. Pizutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18-24 (1928). See also Leathers, Rethinking
Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755, 779 (1982-83).
', Leathers, supra note 33, at 779.
" 453 U.S. 186 (1977).
Id. at 212 (rejecting the distinction among actions in rem, quasi in rem and in
personam as a valid distinction for structuring notice schemes).
37 Id.
38 Id.
19 Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). In Mennonite, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether constructive notice to a
mortgagee having a recorded interest is constitutionally adequate notice of a proceeding
to sell the mortgaged property for nonpayment of taxes. Id. at 792. The Court held that
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An analysis of the Kentucky statute for characteristics rele-
vant in determining its constitutional adequacy begins with an
overview of the nature of titles to mineral estates. Mineral estates
frequently have been sold in fractional amounts severed from
the corresponding surface estate. This often results in fragmented
ownership of a single tract. 4° Severed estates are fragmented
further over time because of testate and intestate succession,
interim ownership by corporations which have dissolved, infor-
mal partitions, etc.4 1 Because of the fractional nature of mineral
ownership, the possibility exists that the identity or whereabouts
of one chain of ownership might become lost over time, while o
other claims of ownership in the same estate might remain
identifiable with reasonable inquiry.
4 2
The Kentucky statute recognizes the existence of known own-
ers by providing that:
[a]ny owner whose identity and whereabouts is known, or can
be ascertained by diligent inquiry, or is discovered as a result
of the action brought hereunder; ... may intervene as a matter
of right at any time prior to the entry of judgment approving
the trustee's lease, for the purpose of establishing his title to
the severed mineral interests .... 43
By implication, it appears that after the approval of the trustee's
lease, known owners are foreclosed from establishing their title
to the severed interest. This assertion is bolstered by the provi-
such notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the suit.
Id. at 800. The Court further stated:
[wlhen the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded,
constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed
to the mortgagee's last known available address, or by personal service.
But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice
alone does not satisfy the mandate of Mullane.
Id. at 798. Although Mennonite clearly applies to mortgagees, its application to lien-
holders, judgment creditors, tenants, and other recorded "interests" is uncertain. See
Comment, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams: Insufficient Notice Under the New
York In Rem Statutes, 33 BUFrALO L. REV. 389, 391 (1984).
40 C.f. Note, Severed Mineral Interests, A Problem Without a Solution?, 46 N.D.L.
REv. 451 (1969-70).
" Outerbridge, supra note 1.
42 The Kentucky statute recognizes this; while the statute is directed towards
unknown owners, it provides that owners may intervene.
,3 KRS § 353.468(4) (1983).
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY
sion of the statute which states that "[a]ll persons whether in
being or not in being, having any interest, . . in the severed
mineral interest sought to be leased, shall be bound by the
proceedings hereunder."4
The portion of Kentucky's statute which contains its notice
system provides that:
Service of process shall be as provided by the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure and there shall be filed a lis pendens notice
in the county clerk's office of the county wherein the mineral
estate or the larger portion thereof lies. Immediately upon the
filing of the petition, the petitioner shall advertise as provided
in KRS Chapter 424. 41
The end result of a successful suit under the Kentucky statute
will be a conveyance of title to the interest of the unknown or
missing owners to the surface owner, with the court's endorse-
ment on the face of the conveyance. 6 Although the interests
conveyed may have been defective in the hands of the missing
or unknown owners, 47 the possibility exists that these defects will
be given judicial approval without being subjected to the test of
the adversarial system. 4 This results because while the known
owners may have grounds to challenge the title of the missing
or unknown owners 4 9 there is no requirement that the known
owners be given notice of the proceedings.50 Even though these
potential litigants are given no notice and, therefore, no oppor-
tunity to be heard, they are purportedly bound by the judg-
ment.5'
KRS § 353.466(1) (1983).
KRS § 353.466(3) (1983).
" See supra note 24.
4 For examples of types of challenges to conveyances of mineral interests, see
Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952); Terrill v. Kentucky Block
Cannel Coal Co., 290 Ky. 35, 160 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1942); Kentucky Natural Gas Corp.
v. Carter, 303 Ky. 559, 198 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1946); Von Goerlitz v. Turner, 150 P.2d
278 (C.A. Cal. 1944).
48 See supra note 47.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5' The statute states that "all persons whether in being or not in being, having
any interest ... in the severed mineral interests sought to be leased, shall be bound by
the proceedings." KRS § 353.466(1) (1983) (set out in full at supra note 24).
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Whether this scheme can withstand a constitutional challenge
under Mullane is questionable. In Mullane, the United States
Supreme Court stated that:
'It]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the op-
portunity to be heard.' [citation omitted]. This right to be
heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to
appear or default, acquiesce or contest ...
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections. 2
The Kentucky statute purports to vest title in the owner of
the surface overlying the mineral estate without requiring any
form of notice other than the filing of a lis pendens and publi-
cation. 3 In cases where the plaintiff knows of the existence and
whereabouts of parties having potential challenges to the interest
of the unknown or missing owners, publication will not suffice.
4
Mullane requires that "[the means employed [to effect notice]
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."" This requirement
eliminates constructive notice in cases where the plaintiff knows
the identity or whereabouts of parties holding claims to the
estate. 6 Nothing short of personal notice mailed to the known
owners will be constitutionally adequate under Mullane when
the surface owner knows that such known owners possess claims
against the interests of the unknown or missing mineral owners. 7
Kentucky's statute and the procedures it employs do not
require that known owners be given personal notice, even when
the surface owner knows the proceedings may result in a judg-
52 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted).
KRS §§ 353.460-.476 (1983) (set out in part at supra note 24).
' Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
55 Id.
- See id.
57 See Leathers, supra note 33.
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ment detrimental to the known owner's interests.18 While the
statute gives known owners the option to intervene as a matter
of right,59 the statute gives them no assurance of ever learning
of the actionA° Therefore, the value of that option is negligible.
The value of the option to intervene can be improved by the
same amendment to the Kentucky statute which would bring it
into compliance with Mullane. In order to accomplish these
objectives, the following sentence should be inserted immediately
after the first sentence of KRS 353.466(3): "Personal service
shall be given to any known owner which the petitioner or the
surface owner knows, or reasonably should know, to have claims
in the mineral interest which will be affected by the outcome of
the proceedings." By requiring that known owners with potential
claims receive notice of the proceedings, this sentence would
eliminate the possibility of such claims being adjudicated without
due process of law. The sentence would also satisfy the require-
ment of Wuchter v. Pizutti6l that the system be adequate as
required by law.
62
The due process clause also requires personal notice in cases
where there are known mortgagees of the interest in question.
63
The United States Supreme Court has held that constructive
notice to mortgagees identified in the public records is ineffec-
tive; nothing short of personal service will suffice as to them.6
Therefore, proceedings under the Kentucky statute must give
notice to any known or "reasonably ascertainable" mortgagees.
The previously proposed amendment to the statute should be
expanded to include such mortgagees.6 5 The addition should now
read, "Personal service shall be given to any known or reason-
58 KRS §§ 353.460-.476 (1983) (set out in part at supra note 23). See also KY. R.
Cry. P. 4.05 [hereinafter CR].
59 See supra note 43.
60 See supra note 58.
6J 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
62 Id. at 18-24.
63 Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983).
6, Id. The Court stated: "[njotice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party ... if its name and address
are reasonably ascertainable." Id. at 800.
" See discussion of proposed amendment supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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ably ascertainable owner or mortgagee which the petitioner or
surface owner knows, or reasonably should know, to have claims
in the mineral interest which will be affected by the outcome of
the proceedings."
Having noted those situations which might call for personal
service, the analysis now turns to the notice aimed at those to
whom personal service will not be available. The relevant pro-
visions in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure provide that:
[i]f a party sought to be summoned is: .. . (e) an individual
whose name or place of residence is unknown to the plaintiff;
the clerk shall forthwith, subject to the provisions of Rule
4.06, make an order upon the complaint warning the party to
appear and defend the action within 50 days. 66
Upon executing the order to appear and defend, the clerk is to
appoint a practicing attorney of the court to: (1) serve as attor-
ney for the defendant, 67 and (2) "make diligent efforts to inform
the defendant, by mail, concerning the pendency and nature of
the action against him. . . ." This system is known as notice
through warning order attorney and is the type of notice used
in eminent domain proceedings, judicial challenges to escheat-
ment, and quiet title actions.
69
Although Rule 4.05 is the accepted mode of notice for cases
brought under the Kentucky statute and those of the types listed
above, the Rule provides no alternative means of notification
for cases where notice by mail fails.70 Such a system cannot
survive the Mullane test, for there the Court stated that "[tihe
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually in-
forming the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 17,
Clearly, an individual actually desiring to inform the absentee
would at least publish if all else failed.
7 2
Perhaps the drafters of the Kentucky Act were aware of this




0 Leathers, supra note 33, at 780-82.
70 Id.
13 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
Leathers, supra note 33.
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the petitioner to advertise immediately upon the filing of the
petition. 73 The statute also requires the immediate filing of a lis
pendens as a further attempt to notify the missing or unknown
owners. 74 The court is also empowered to "[o]rder advertisement
elsewhere or by additional means if there is reason to believe
that additional advertisement might result in identifying and
locating the unknown or missing owners." 7 5 This provision is
especially important since at this stage of the proceedings the
court has the information in the petition "[s]etting forth the
efforts to locate and identify the unknown or missing owners."
76
The combination of the above described mechanisms leads one
to conclude that the scheme is "[s]uch as one desirous of actually
informing [the missing or unknown owners] might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.
' '17
The statute is constitutional as it applies to the unknown
owners. Although the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure are
defective in not providing for notice by publication once notice
by mail fails,7 8 the statute compensates for this defect by re-
quiring publication in all cases .
79
In addition to the above detailed provisions related to finding
missing or unknown owners, the statute provides two additional
protections to those owners once the proceedings begin. First,
the court must appoint a trustee ad litem who is to review the
petition, file an answer, and "make an independent inquiry and
search for the purpose of identifying and locating the unknown
or missing owners and he shall report to the court the results of
the investigation. '" 80 Second, during the period of the adminis-
tration of the trust, the trustee can be authorized upon motion
"to expend an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the
funds collected by the trustee [from the proceeds of the leases]
for the purpose of instituting a search for the unknown or
missing owners." 8'
73 KRS § 353.466(3) (1983) detailed in full at supra note 23.
7. Id.
75 Id.
76 KRS § 353.466(2).
77 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
71 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
-0 KRS § 353.466(4) (1983) (detailed in full at supra note 23).
-- KRS § 353.468(5) (1983).
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These additional protections, while not directly impacting
upon the constitutionality of the statute's notice provisions, do
show the legislature's concern for protecting the missing or
unknown owner's property interest. When coupled with the seven
year waiting period, the statute provides such owners with every
reasonable opportunity to be located and/or come forward to
present their claim.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short 2 gives validity to
statutes aimed at curing ownership defects in otherwise devel-
opable mineral estates. For Kentucky's statute, Short requires
proceedings which comply with the notice provisions of Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, Co. ;83 thus, Short incorpo-
rates the notice defects existing outside the substantive provisions
of the law. Any defect existing in the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure, alone or when viewed in conjunction with the imple-
menting statute, imperils a judgment under the statute. As the
Kentucky statute and procedural rules now read, they are suspect
to challenge under the Mullane rationale because they do not
require personal notice to known or reasonably ascertainable
persons against whom the outcome of the proceedings is con-
ceivably detrimental. As the statute and its notice provisions
relate to unknown or missing owners, there is no defect under
a Mullane analysis.
To improve the Kentucky statute against claims that it does
not afford the known owners or mortgagees due process of law,
KRS 353.466(3) should be amended by requiring personal service
to those persons having an interest in the mineral estate who
may be affected by the litigation. This would assure that such
owners or mortgagees have an opportunity to assert their claims
or right to intervene in the proceedings, and foreclose them from
claiming that their interests were affected without due process of
law.
Gary W. Napier
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
83 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

